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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Billy Shearin pied guilty to one count of burglary and was free to argue an 
appropriate sentence; in exchange, the State dismissed additional counts and agreed 
to cap its sentencing recommendation at a unified term of 10 years, with 3 and one-half 
years fixed. (Augmentation: Court Minutes - Entry of Plea.) 1 During the sentencing 
hearing, counsel for Mr. Shearin asked the court to allow Mr. Shearin to participate in a 
Therapeutic Community Rider; however, the court followed the State's recommendation 
and imposed a unified term of 10 years with 3 and one-half years fixed. (Augmentation: 
Court Minutes - Sentencing.) No direct appeal was filed. 
Mr. Shearin filed a timely Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief and an 
accompanying brief in support alleging generally that his trial counsel failed to handle 
his case in a reasonable manner, failed to file a notice of appeal after he asked that one 
be filed, and failed to ask for a continuance in order to better defend against the 
amended complaint. (R., pp.4-15.) Mr. Shearin was appointed counsel who filed an 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief which was verified by Mr. Shearin as 
replacing his original pro se petition. (R., pp.22-31, 35-39.) In his Amended Petition, 
Mr. Shearin raised two claims. (R., pp.35-39.) First, Mr. Shearing claimed that trial 
counsel failed to file a motion to suppress asserting the following: 
The motion should have attacked the police using the Fourth 
Amendment waiver attached to Petitioner's parole conditions. Petitioner 
argues that the police enlisted the parole officer's assistance merely for 
the purpose of utilizing the parole officer's authority to conduct a 
warrantless search. A Boise City Police Officer searched the vehicle prior 
to the arrival of a representative from probation and parole being present. 
The search continued to the Petitioner's home. At his home there were 
1 Mr. Shearin filed a motion to augment the record with the Court Minutes from his entry 
of plea and sentencing hearings, and that motion is currently pending. · 
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additional representatives from probation and parole. The Petitioner 
argues the subsequent search of his home was tainted by the original 
illegal search of his car. 
(R., p.36 (internal citations omitted).) Mr. Shearin support this claim with a copy of the 
transcript of the preliminary hearing. (R., pp.40-60.) Mr. Shearin's second claim was 
that, "Trial Counsel failed to file a notice of appeal despite Petitioner having asked for it, 
or by having attempted unsuccessfully to contact Trial Counsel and ask that an appeal 
be filed." (R., pp.36-37.) An evidentiary hearing was held on Mr. Shearin's claims. 
(See generally Tr.) 
Parole agent Rhonda Foust testified generally about parolees' Fourth 
Amendment waivers, including the Department of Parole and Probation's practice of 
authorizing police officers to conduct searches if requested, and that she was 
Mr. Shearin's parole officer, although she was not involved in the search in question as 
she was in training that day. (Tr., p.4, L.1 - p.12, L.11.) The State introduced 
Mr. Shearin's signed parole agreement through Ms. Foust which includes a clause 
stating, "Parolee will submit to a search of person or proterty, to include residence and 
vehicle, at any time and place by any agent of Field and Community Services and s/he 
does waive constitutional right to be free from such searches." (Tr., p.12, L.20 - p.19, 
L.3; Ex. A.) 
Laila Jeffries, another probation and parole agent, testified that she was asked 
by the duty officer to respond to a traffic stop and to first search Mr. Shearin's vehicle, 
and to then search his residence. (Tr., p.20, L.1 - p.23, L.9.) Ms. Jeffries testified that 
when she arrived at the traffic stop, she and police officers searched the trunk, but she 
did not recall whether or not the trunk was opened before she arrived. (Tr., p.23, L.1 0 -
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p.25, L.8.) After searching the vehicle, Ms. Jeffries had Mr. Shearin transported to his 
residence where she conducted a search of his home with police officers. (Tr., p.25, 
L.9 - p.27, L.17.) 
Mr. Shearin testified that he was pulled over on the day in question for making a 
"California stop," and after about 20 minutes, he was placed in the back of a patrol car 
and police officers began searching his vehicle. (Tr., p.33, L.1 - p.36, L.22.) He 
testified that Ms. Jeffries arrived about 45 minutes after the search began. (Tr., p.36, 
L.23 - p.37, L.6.) Mr. Shearin further testified that he told his attorney that he wanted 
her to file an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion and to file an appeal 
after the district court pronounced sentence upon him, but that none were filed. 
(Tr., p.39, L.19 - p.42, L.3.) He said that his attorney responded, '"We will work on it."' 
(Tr., p.42, L.8 - p.43, L.8.) Mr. Shearin attempted to call his trial counsel after 
sentencing while he was in the penitentiary, but he was unable to connect with her and 
he did not write her any letters. (Tr., p.43, L.12 - p.44, L.14.) Prior to being sentenced, 
Mr. Shearin spoke to his attorney about filing a Rule 35 motion, but he does not 
remember whether they spoke about the differences between a Rule 35 motion and an 
appeal. (Tr., p.45, L.15 - p.46, L.10.) In rebuttal, Mr. Shearin testified that after he was 
sentenced, he twice called his attorney to speak about the Rule 35 motion and the 
appeal, but trial counsel was unavailable and he did not leave any messages. 
(Tr., p.124, L.15-p.127, L.11.) 
Mr. Shearin's trial counsel testified that during one of her initial meetings with 
Mr. Shearin, he asked her about filing a Rule 35 motion (which she found odd because 
he had not entered his guilty plea at that point), and she explained to him what a Rule 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT-3 
35 motion was, the timelines associated with such a motion, and that she would file one 
after his sentencing should he want one. (Tr., p.55, L.11 - p.56, L.13.) Trial counsel 
testified that she did not recall whether or not she spoke with him about filing an appeal. 
(Tr., p.56, Ls.14-25.) She testified that she did not recall seeing any issues that would 
warrant a suppression motion. (Tr., p.57, L.15 - p.58, L.21.) Trial counsel testified that 
if a client asks her to file a Notice of Appeal she will do so, but she does not recall 
Mr. Shearin asking her to do so, and she has no correspondence or notes to that effect. 
(Tr., p.59, L.12 - p.63, L.12.) Trial counsel testified that Mr. Shearin wanted a fixed 
sentence, with no indeterminate time, and she was aware that his actual sentence was 
greater than what he wanted. (Tr., p.68, L.8 - p.69, L.9.) She testified that Mr. Shearin 
would have had to contact her if he wanted an appeal. (Tr., p.70, Ls.2-25.) Trial 
counsel testified that she did not recall whether or not Mr. Shearin was happy with his 
sentence, and that her failure to meet with him after sentencing is consistent with her 
practice. (Tr., p.72, L.13 - p.73, L.2.) Trial counsel testified that if one of her clients 
asks about an appeal while being taken out of the courtroom after sentencing and she 
does not have time to speak with them then, she tells her clients to contact her so that 
they may have a conversation about it. (Tr., p.77, L.8 - p.78, L.8.) 
Boise Police Officer Curt Crum testified that he was working as a supervisor in 
the organized crime interdiction team when he received a call from a loss prevention 
manager at a Fred Meyer store that Mr. Shearin, who had previously been suspected of 
committing thefts at various Fred Meyer stores, was seen in the store and suspected of 
possibly committing theft. (Tr., p.80, L.14 - p.85, L.12.) Aware that Mr. Shearin's 
license was suspended, and after witnessing him fail to stop at a stop sign, Officer 
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Crum contacted Officer Keely and told him to conduct a traffic stop. (Tr., p.85, L.13 -
p.87, L.12.) Officer Crum was aware that Officer Keely had permission from Probation 
and Parole to conduct a search pursuant to Mr. Shearin's Fourth Amendment waiver, 
and he was not sure exactly when Ms. Jeffries arrived at the scene, but he believed the 
trunk was open by the time she arrived. (Tr., p.87, Ls.13-25.) Officer Crum also 
testified about how people commit on-going retail thefts and about the information he 
had that suggested Mr. Shearin may have been committing these crimes. (Tr., p.88, 
L.1 - p.94, L.10.) He was also at Mr. Shearin's home when Laila Jeffries and other 
officers conducted their search. (Tr., p.101, L.s.2-11.) 
Officer Steve Keely testified that Officer Crum informed him Mr. Shearin was 
suspected of committing retail thefts and that he observed Mr. Shearin commit a traffic 
infraction, Mr. Keely called Mike Coolidge from the Probation and Parole Department 
who confirmed that Mr. Shearin was on parole and had signed a Fourth Amendment 
waiver, and Mr. Coolidge asked that Officer Keely search Mr. Shearin's vehicle and 
residence. (Tr., p.104, L. 13 - p.111, L.12.) Officer Keely conducted a traffic stop and 
confirmed that his license was suspended. (Tr., p.111, Ls.13-22.) He and other 
officers began searching Mr. Shearin's vehicle prior to Ms. Jeffries arriving. (Tr., p.112, 
L.2-p.119, L.4.) 
Counsel for Mr. Shearin started his closing argument by stating, "Your Honor, I 
hope I state the standard correctly," and argued the standard applicable to 
Mr. Shearin's suppression motion issue. (Tr., p.128, L.7 - p.129, L.1.) Counsel argued 
. that he believed police officers were using Probation and Parole as "cover" to conduct 
an otherwise unreasonable search, noting that officers began searching prior to the 
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arrival of Ms. Jeffries. (Tr., p.129, L.5- p.130, L.12.) Regarding the second claim, 
counsel argued, "I believe I have to show on my second count that my client requested 
that the public defender file an appeal." (Tr., p.128, L.7 - p.129, L.4.) When arguing 
this issue, counsel asserted the following: 
In addition, on count - claim two, with regards to [trial counsel's] 
testimony there is a, these two bits of testimony with relation to the 
request for appeal are at loggerheads. You can't necessarily believe 
Mr. Shearin and at the same time believe [trial counsel]. But I would 
submit to the Court that maybe [trial counsel's] memory isn't serving her 
as well as may be Mr. Shearin's, keeping in mind that Mr. Shearin 
received a sentence greater than what he expected, not greater than was 
contemplated by the plea agreement, but greater than what his trial 
counsel was arguing for. Certainly he had requested that she consider a 
Rule 35 at his very first meeting so he was, had some desire I think 
manifest by virtue of making inquiry into some sort of post-sentencing 
motion work. And regardless, none of that was done. 
In addition, he indicated that he did make some attempt after the 
fact and, from [trial counsel's] point of view, unless she heard from him via 
a letter or with a telephone message or directly heard him request an 
appeal, she would have no idea that that's what he wanted. I think that 
the evidence is clear from at least the Petitioner's standpoint today that in 
his mind he requested an appeal. I ask that we prevail on that claim as 
well. Thank you. 
(Tr., p.130, L.14 - p.131, L.16.) The district court asked counsel for Mr. Shearin to 
address whether the inevitable discovery doctrine would apply to the Fourth 
Amendment issue, and counsel recognized that the doctrine would apply but argued, 
"the nuance here I think is that this particular officer is routinely taking upon himself to 
search on behalf of P and P perceives that he has authority to do so when in fact he 
may not," and argued that this practice leads Probation and Parole2 to "become the 
2 Counsel referred to the police department as the "stalking horse" but, in context, it is 
clear that defense counsel meant that Probation and Parole was acting as a "stalking 
horse" on behalf of the police department. 
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stalking horse that Idaho case law suggests" they should not be. (Tr., p.131, L.17 -
p.134, L.5.) 
The State argued that the search was valid either due to the Fourth Amendment 
waiver or because it was otherwise reasonable, and further asserted that Mr. Shearin 
failed to demonstrate that he asked trial counsel to file a Notice of Appeal or a Rule 35 
motion. (Tr., p.134, L.11 - p.140, L.16.) In rebuttal, counsel for Mr. Shearin made 
clear that he was not asserting any ineffective assistance of counsel in the failure to file 
a Rule 35 motion. (Tr., p.140, L.19 - p.141, L.8.) Regarding the claim that trial counsel 
failed to file a Notice of Appeal, trial counsel asserted, "This question on the appeal I 
think that the law is settled that you have to affirmatively ask for it and that you have to 
make your wishes known to your defender that you want the appeal,"3 and that, "I think 
that the only way that the Court could provide relief on that issue is to find that 
3 This statement of the law is inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's 
holding in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), finding that ineffective assistance 
of counsel may be found even where the petitioner does not specifically ask counsel to 
file an appeal: 
In those cases where the defendant neither instructs counsel to file an 
appeal nor asks that an appeal not be taken, we believe the question 
whether counsel has performed deficiently by not filing a notice of appeal 
is best answered by first asking a separate, but antecedent, question: 
whether counsel in fact consulted with the defendant about an appeal. We 
employ the term "consulf' to convey a specific meaning-advising the 
defendant about the advantages and disadvantages of taking an appeal, 
and making a reasonable effort to discover the defendant's wishes. If 
counsel has consulted with the defendant, the question of deficient 
performance is easily answered: Counsel performs in a professionally 
unreasonable manner only by failing to follow the defendant's express 
instructions with respect to an appeal. See supra, at 1034 and this page. 
If counsel has not consulted with the defendant, the court must in turn ask 
a second, and subsidiary, question: whether counsel's failure to consult 
with the defendant itself constitutes deficient performance. 
Id. at 478 (emphasis added). 
-- ------------·---
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Mr. Shearin's testimony that he, you know, chirped into the ear of his handling counsel 
that he desired an appeal on the way out of the courtroom is believable and meets the 
evidentiary burden in this case." (Tr., p.141, L.9 -142, L.24.) 
The district court orally pronounced that it determined that the· parties tried by 
consent a claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to file a Rule 35 motion, denied 
that claim, and took the other claims under advisement. (Tr., p.143, L.11 - p.145, 
L.23.) The district court entered a written Order denying Mr. Shearin's petition, and 
detailing the court's findings of facts and conclusions of law. (R., pp.73-95.) Regarding 
Mr. Shearin's claim that trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress, the district court 
found that police officers had authority to search Mr. Shearin's vehicle and residence 
pursuant to the Probation and Parole officers granting them permission to do so based 
upon Mr. Shearin's Fourth Amendment waiver. (R., pp.89-92.) Alternatively, the district 
court found that officers had either reasaonable suspicion or probable cause to search 
the rest of Mr. Shearin's vehicle after conducting a valid traffic stop and seeing items 
that may have been stolen from the Fred Meyer store in plain view inside the vehicle, 
and that trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress. 
(R., pp.91-92.) 
Regarding Mr. Shearin's claim that counsel failed to file a Notice of Appeal, the 
district court provided the following findings of facts and conclusions of law4: 
As both counsel acknowledged at the hearing, the petitioner's claim 
that he unequivocally informed counsel at the sentencing hearing of his 
desire to appeal cannot be reconciled with Ms. Comstock's testimony that 
4 The district court's order included a footnote stating, "The parties concede that if an 
equivocal inquiry concerning an appeal were made, but not clarified to the point of 
certainty, it would not be ineffective assistance for counsel to neglect to pursue the 
issue further or to file an appeal upon her best guess concerning her client's wishes." 
(R., p.92, n.3 (emphasis in original).) 
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if such a request had been unequivocally made, she would have made a 
note of it in the petitioner's file and the appeal would have been noticed 
that very day, in accordance with her typical practice. Therefore, this 
Court is required to determine, from this conflicting testimony, whether in 
fact an unequivocal request was made. This is the sole issue as to this 
claim because the parties agree that if an unequivocal request was made, 
and the appeal was not timely filed, the loss of the opportunity to appeal 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel without the need for further 
evidence. 
The Court finds, based on the testimony provided at the hearing, 
that an unequivocal request was not made by the petitioner, or, if one was 
attempted, the attempt fell short of the efforts a reasonable person in the 
petitioner's position would have made in order to ensure that his wishes 
were known. The petitioner's testimony is that he made the request at the 
sentencing hearing, but he could not say with any certainty whether 
Ms. Comstock actually heard and understood him, since the request was 
likely made in haste as the next case was being called (perhaps while the 
petitioner was being taken into custody) rather than in conference with 
Ms. Comstock or under similar circumstances. That the petitioner had 
some doubts as to whether Ms. Comstock was aware that he wished to 
appeal is reflected in the fact that the petitioner called the office of the 
public defender on several occasions after he was sentenced to check on 
his case. Unfortunately, on each such occasion Ms. Comstock could not 
immediately answer the phone and, critically, the petitioner on each 
occasion chose not to leave any message. A reasonable person, wishing 
to appeal the judgment of conviction in his case, and knowing that he had 
not had an adequate opportunity to clearly apprise his attorney of his 
wishes, would not have contented himself with speaking to the "front 
desk" of the public defender's office and declining the invitation to leave a 
message. The petitioner admits that he left no messages, and this Court 
finds that this admission bolsters Ms. Comstock's testimony that no 
request was made (or at least heard), especially given that the petitioner's 
testimony concerning the rushed circumstances in which he allegedly 
made the request also supports Ms. Comstock's testimony that if such a 
request had been made, she did not become aware of it. 
Further, the Court has been given no reason to doubt 
Ms. Comstock's testimony that had she been made aware of the 
petitioner's wishes, there would be documentary evidence in the 
petitioner's file with the public defender's office. Of course, this Court is 
not blind to the possibility that an absence of such evidence could easily 
be fabricated to avoid a charge of incompetent representation, but finds 
no reason to suspect such conduct here, where the only consequence of 
a simple admission by Ms. Comstock that she forgot to file the appeal 
would be the reinstatement of the petitioner's ability to appeal. In short, 
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after considering all the relevant evidence, the Court credits 
Ms. Comstock's testimony that the Petitioner never made his 
desire to appeal unequivocally known, and further finds her 
testimony to be the more credible. Accordingly, her failure 
to timely file a notice of appeal did not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(R.,pp92-94) Mr. Shearin filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the 
District Court's final judgment. (R., pp. 96-100). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the District Court err when it dismissed the Petition 
for Post Conviction Relief? 
Was the Office of the State Appellate Defender 
ineffective when it did not litigate to this Court 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel? 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION. 
The District Court dismissed the Petition for Post Conviction 
relief and used the wrong standard of law to do so. 
The Court stated that the Petitioner never made his desire 
to appeal unequivocally known to Ms. Comstock. 
The record of the case does in fact show that the Petitioner 
informed counsel that he wished to appeal. 
Ms. Comstock gave evidence to the Court that the Petitioner, 
when he was leaving the Court-room, asked her to file a Notice of 
Appeal. 
Under the case of Roe V. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, (2000), 
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the United States Supreme Court has stated, 
"We have long held that a lawyer who disregards specific 
instructions from the Defendant to file a notice of appeal 
acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable". Citing, 
Rodriguez V. United states, 395 U.S. 327, 89 s.ct. 1715, 
23 L.Ed. 2d 340, (1969); Peguera V. United States, 526 U.S. 
23, 119 s.ct. 961, 143 L.Ed. 2d 18, t1999). 
There was no evidence submitted that the Petitioner did not 
ask his attorney to file such an Appeal. 
Instead the Court placed the entire burden upon the Petitioner 
to show that he affirmatively and unequivocal~y showed his desire 
to appeal. 
that, 
The Court in Roe V. Flores-Ortega, Supra, conclusively held 
" ••• Counsel has a Constitutionally imposed duty to 
consult with the Defendant about an appeal when there 
is reason to think either, (1) that a rationale 
defendant would want to appeal; or, (2) that the 
particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to Counsel 
that he wanted to appeal ••• ". 
The Court had information before it that an appeal was asked 
to be filed, and that Counsel did not consult with the Petitioner 
about filing such an appeal when it was clear that a reasonable 
person would have pursued such an appeal. 
Based upon the above facts, it is clear that Counsel was 
ineffective for not consulting with the Petitioner about filing 
the Notice of Appeal; and that Counsel was ineffective for not 
filing the above Notice of Appeal. 
Furthermore, based upon the proven facts as listed above, 
it is perfectly clear that the District Court erred when it 
dismissed this case. 
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It is based upon the fact that Counsel was ineffective for 
not filing the requested notice of appeal that counsel was not 
acting as the Counsel guaranteed to the Appellant/Petitioner by 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Therefore, the District Court erred when it dismissed the 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 
Furthermore, for purposes of this appeal, the Appellant/ 
Petitioner has been effectively denied his right to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense, i.e., for purposes of counsel 
on appeal, during this proceeding. 
The Office of the State Appellate Defender moved this Court 
to be allowed to withdraw as the attorney for this Appeal, stating 
that they could not find any type of colorable claim for appellate 
purposes. 
However, the Appellant, who is untrained at the law, has 
presented to this Court the above claim, which is in-fact a good 
meritorious claim, and it is ineffective assistance of counsel 
on appeal for the Office of the ~tate Appellate Defender not to 
have presented this claim to the court for review. 
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT FILING A SUPPRESSION MOTION 
The Appellant/Petitioner herein contends that Counsel was 
ineffective when Counsel did not, or would not file a Motion to 
Suppress the evidence gathered in this case. 
Counsel believed that such a Motion would h~ve been denied 
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because the Appellant/Petitioner had previously signed a waiver 
of his right to be free from warrantless searches and seizures. 
However, the Appellant/Petitioner contends that the waiver 
he signed only authorized his parole officer to conduct such 
searches, and was not able to be transferred to:another person or 
agency without the consent of the Appellant/Petitioner. 
The search in this case was not conducted by the Parole 
Officer, but was done by Police who did not have consent to search. 
Therefore, any evidence gathered was "fruit of the poisonous tree", 
and therefore could not be used against him. 
Counsel, during the District Court proceedings, did not file 
the requested Motion to Suppress, and it is the position of the 
Appellant/Petitioner that this action does in fact constitute 
ineffective performance. 
At the hearing on the Post Conviction Petition, and for reasons 
of denial, the district Court cited to various cases, all of which 
concerned individuals who were on Probation, and not on Parole. 
None of the cases cited indicated that a waiver of the right 
to be free from warrantless searches and seizures could be 
transferred to a party, or implemented by a party other than 
the person to whom the waiver was directed. 
In short, there is no showing that once a valid waiver of the 
right to be free from warrantless searches and seizures is given 
to a Probation or Parole Officer that the Probation or Parole 
Officer can then transfer that right or waiver to yet another party. 
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The Appellant contends that the District Court, when dismissing the 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief used the standards for a person who is 
on Probation and signs a waiver, when in effect the Appellant was on PAROLE, 
and as such a different standard applies, and the search was mandated to be done 
only by the Office of his Parole supervision Officer • 
. FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants 
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Similarly, Article I, § 17 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. 
Neither a search warrant nor probable cause is needed for the search of a probationer's 
home where such a search is conducted pursuant to a valid regulation that satisfies the Fourth 
Amendment's reasonableness standard by requiring reasonable grounds for a search, because a 
state's operation of a probation system.presents "special needs" beyond normal law enforcement 
that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements. Probation, 
like incarceration, is a form of criminal sanction and a warrant or probable cause requirement 
would interfere with the supervisory relationship required for proper functioning of the system. 
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164 (1987). 
In United States v. Shephard, 21 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that the federal courts would look to state law to determine whether an arrest was 
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legal, in order to further determine if evidence discovered in a search incident to arrest should be 
suppressed. In that case, Montana law required a deputy to obtain written authorization from a 
probation officer prior to the deputy arresting a probationer for a probation violation. Id at 936. 
After obtaining verbal permission from the defendant's probation officer to arrest the defendant 
upon suspicion that he had violated his probation, the arrest was accomplished and the arresting 
deputy proceeded into the defendant's apartment to retrieve the defendant's wallet at the 
defendant's request. Id at 935. In the process of doing so, the deputy discovered a gun in plain 
view, the possession of which constituted a violation of the defendant's probation and also 
constituted the (federal) crime for which the defendant was convicted in the trial court. Id Toe 
Ninth Circuit suppressed the evidence and reversed the conviction even though verbal permission 
to arrest bad been obtained, and the defendant was required to submit to warrantless searches as a 
term of his probation, because the law was clear that the authority to arrest for violations of 
probation bad to be in writing, and the gun was found incident to the arrest, and not as the result 
of a search. Therefore, because the arrest was illegal all the fruits thereof, to include the gun 
found in plain view, should have been suppressed. Id That said, in dicta the Ninth Circuit 
indicated that if the issue was the legality of a search rather than an arrest followed by the 
discovery of contraband in plain view, the defendant's waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights as 
a condition of probation would have been relevant However, the issue was the legality of the 
arrest which resulted in the finding of incriminating evidence; no "search" was conducted. Id 
n.10. 
In U.S. v. Richardson, 849 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit made clear that the 
physical presence of a probation officer at the scene of a search conducted by the police in a case 
in which the probation officer bad verbally authorized the search was not required, so long as the 
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Erobation officer was not merely acting as a "stalking horse" for the police. The Ninth Circuit 
stated: 
On balance we believe the Court approved the concept that the decision to 
authorize the search was more important than who was present when the search 
was made. Given the large case loads of most probation officers, requiring the 
probation officer's physical presence during every probation search or requiring 
close supervision of all probation searches would unnecessarily interfere with the 
twin goals of probation: rehabilitation of the probationer and protection of society. 
Id at 442. The Court also cited with approval the following language from United States v. 
Jarrard, 754 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1985): "Parole and law enforcement officials frequently 
cooperate in the cotl!"se of their work. Parole officers often receive information concerning their 
parolees that is uncovered in police criminal investigations. The fact that police investigation of 
[ a crime] ... preceded the involvement of parole officials does not in itself indicate that the search 
was initiated by police officers." Id at 441. 
In an unpublished decision issued in 1995, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[a] probation 
officer is not a stalking horse ifhe, rather than the police, initiate[s] the search in the performance 
of his duties as a parole [or probation] officer. Officer Hook initiated each of the warrantless 
searches with the permission of her supervisor, and her reliance on the information provided by 
Detective Armstrong was proper. Officer Hook's request for police assistance to conduct the 
searches was proper. Lewis v. Idaho State Bd of Corr., 68 F.3d 480 (9th Cir. 1995). 
Toe unique status of parolees vis a vis the Fourth Amendment was affirmed by the United 
States Supreme Court in the case of Pennsylvania Bd of Probation v. Keith M Scott, 524 U.S. 
357, 118 S.Ct 2014 (1998). In that case, the Supreme Court held that in a parole revocation 
bearing, the exclusionary rule did not apply to suppress evidence obtained in an illegal search 
which was used to prove the parolee's violation of parole, and which resulted in its revocation. 
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Although Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer dissented and described a probation revocation 
proceeding as "'analogous" to a parole revocation hearing, it would appear that this ruling is 
limited to administrative actions by a parole board, and would not extend to a judicial proceeding 
before a trial court such as a probation revocation hearing. In any event, this Court believes a 
higher standard would be applied in probation revocation proceedings which, under Idaho law, 
are judicial and not administrative hearings. 
Regardless of particular suppression issues, in a broader context the United States 
Supreme Court bas made clear that both probationers and parolees have a diminished expectation 
of privacy when it comes to Fourth Amendment search and seizure law. In United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 587 (2001 ), the Court upheld a provision in a California Court 
order providing that Knights was required to submit to a search at any time, with or without a 
search or arrest warrant or reasonable cause, by any probation or law enforcement officer. The 
specific language of the condition quoted by the Court stated that Knights would "[s]ubmit his 
person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at any time, with or 
without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law 
enforcement officer." The Court pointed out that the language was unambiguous and that 
Knights had been unambiguously informed of the search condition when he signed his probation 
order, which further provided above his signature that "I HA VE RECEIVED A COPY, READ 
AND UNDERSTAND THE ABOVE TERMS AND CONDmONS OF PROBATION AND 
AGREE TO ABIDE BY THE SAME." Further, the Court was highly critical of the underlying 
Ninth Circuit decision which had found the search violative of the Fourth Amendment by citing 
to Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164 (1987). Of that decision the Supreme 
Court stated: "This dubious logic - that an opinion upholding the Constitutionality of a particular 
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search implicitly holds unconstitutional any search that is not like it - runs contrary to Griffin's 
express statement thai its •special needs' holding made it 'unnecessary to consider whether' 
warrantless searches of probationers were otherwise reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment." (Internal citations omitted). 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court declined to adopt the government's position that the 
defendant's acceptance of the condition was voluntary because he could have rejected probation 
and gone to prison if he wished, and that the waiver was analogous to many voluntary decision 
made by defendants in criminal cases, such as waiving the right to trial in the course of a plea 
bargain. Instead, the Court stated that "we conclude the search of Knights was reasonable under 
our general Fourth Amendment approach of 'examining the totality of the circumstances' with 
the probation search condition being a salient circumstance." (Internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted.) The Court then went on to state that "[t]be touchstone of the Fourth Amendment 
is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined by 'assessing, on the one 
hand, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate government interests."' 
(Internal citations and quotations marks omitted.) The Court went on to hold that in assessing 
the degree to which Knights' privacy was intruded upon by the search at issue, "the probation 
order clearly expressed the search condition and Knights was unambiguously informed of it. The 
probation condition thus significantly diminished Knights' reasonable expectation of privacy." 
Further, the Court explained at length the governmental interests at stake: 
In assessing the governmental interest side of the balance, it must be remembered 
that "the very assumption of the institution of probation" is that the probationer 
"is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law." The recidivism rate 
of probationers is significantly higher than the general crime rate. See U.S. Dept 
of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of 
Felons on Probation, 1986-89, pp. 1, 6 (Feb.1992) (reporting that 43% of 79,000 
felons placed on probation in 17 States were rearrested for a felony within three 
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years while still on probation); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole Violators in State Prison, 1991, 
p. 3 (Aug.1995) ( stating that in 1991, 23 % of state prisoners were probation 
violators). And probationers have even more of an incentive to conceal their 
criminal activities and quickly dispose of incriminating evidence than the ordinary 
criminal because probationers are aware that they may be subject to supervision 
and face revocation of probation, and possible incarceration, in proceedings in 
which the trial rights of a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, among other 
things, do not apply .... 
The State has a dual concern with a probationer. On the one hand is the hope that 
he will successfully complete probation and be integrated back into the 
community. On the other is the concern, quite justified, that he will be more likely 
to engage in criminal conduct than an ordinary member of the community. The 
view of the Court of Appeals in this case would require the State to shut its eyes 
to the latter concern and concentrate only on the former. But we hold that the 
Fourth Amendment does not put the State to such a choice. Its interest in 
apprehending violators of the criminal law, thereby protecting potential victims of 
criminal enterprise, may therefore justifiably focus on probationers in a way that it 
does not on the ordinary citizen. 
Id at 120-21 (internal citations omitted). The Court then balanced the factors it had considered: 
We hold that the balance of these considerations requires no more than reasonable 
suspicion to conduct a search of this probationer's house. The degree of 
individualized suspicion required of a search is a determination of when there is a 
sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct is occurring to make the 
intrusion on the individual's privacy interest reasonable. Although the Fourth 
Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied in the term 
"probable cause," a lesser degree satisfies the Constitution when the balance of 
governmental and private interests makes such a standard reasonable. Those 
interests warrant a lesser than probable-cause standard here. When an officer has 
reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in 
criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that 
an intrusion on the probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests is 
reasonable. 
The same circumstances that lead us to conclude that reasonable suspicion is 
constitutionally sufficient also render a warrant requirement unnecessary. 
Id at 121-22 (internal citations omitted). 
That said, the Court was unwilling to grant unfettered authority to the government to 
conduct warrantless searches of all probationers and parolees. [n a footnote to the opinion, the 
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Court stated that "[ w ]e do not decide whether the probation condition so diminished, or 
completely eliminated, Knights' reasonable expectation of privacy (or constituted consent) that a 
search by a law enforcement officer without any individualized suspicion would have satisfied 
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment The terms of the probation condition 
permit such a search, but we need not address the constitutionality of a suspicionless search 
because the search in this case was supported by reasonable suspicion." Id at 120 n.6. 
Clearly, Griffin v. Wisconsin does require an analysis oflocal law and regulations as well 
as probation or parole conditions actually imposed, and the defendant's knowledge of them, so as 
to balance the defendant's diminished expectation of privacy against the state's legitimate 
interest in maintaining the integrity of its parole and probation programs as required by Knights. 
It also seems clear that this Court must also consider the specific relationships between law 
enforcement officers and probation and parole agents and officers established under Idaho law, as 
was so clearly emphasized by the Ninth Circuit in Shephard, as part of the totality of the 
circumstances used to assess the reasonableness of the searches in the instant case consistent with 
Knights. 
All of the cases cited by the above Courts concern the rig:1ts of a 
person who is serving a term of probation. The Appellant/Petitioner herein was 
serving his sentence while on Parole, which carries different standings than 
a probationer. 
Finally, the Appellant/Petitioner did not sign a waiver of his rights to 
be free from search and seizures without a warrant, and authorize that waiver 
to be transferred to any other person. He signed a valid waiver so that his 
parole officer could conduct such searches, not the police ·looking for evidence 
of a crime. Not so that he could be incriminated. To allow this type of 
activity is not a valid knowing and intelligent waiver of rights. 
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THE OFFICE OF THE STATE APPELLATE DEFENDER WAS 
INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT LITIGATING THESE CLAIMS ON 
APPEAL 
The Appellate/Petitioner has shown this Court that there 
was in fact several viable claims that could have been presented 
to this Court for review. 
The State Appellate Defender was ineffective for not litigating 
to this Court that Trial Counsel was ineffective for litigating 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to this Court in this 
Appeal. 
As this Court is well aware, the Office of the State Appellate 
Defender will not litigate to this Court claims of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel to this Court during the Appellate process. 
This leaves the Appellate/Petitioner in the position of not having 
the assistance of counsel during the entirety of his entire direct 
appeal process. 
In short, the appeal has been "bi-furicated" into two 
different areas. In one area is the claims that will be raised by 
the Office of the State Appellate Defender; and the second area is 
the claims that the Office of the state Appellate Defender will 
not litigate, sucha s claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
during the District Court process. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons as given this Court should remand this case 
with instructions that the Post Conviction Petition was not 
properly ruled upon, and inasmuch, the Petitioner was denied 
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his right to have the effective assistance of counsel as was 
guaranteed to him under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, for Counsel's failure to contact him and discuss 
with him the filing of the Notice of Appeal. 
Furthermore, the Appellant/Petitioner was also denied his 
right to have the effective assistance of counsel during the 
Appeal process, when the Office of the State Appellate Defender 
would not file a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
during the appeal process, and instead moved to withdraw from the 
appeal. 
Finally, there is doubt as to whether or not a reasonable 
attorney would not have filed the Motion to Suppress prior to 
engaging in plea negotiations with the State. 
A reasonable and an effective counsel would certainly have 
attempted to have the evidence against their client suppressed 
prior to engaging in plea negotiations with the State; or, prior 
to convincing the Appellant/Petitioner that the best course of 
conduct was to enter into a plea of guilty. 
It is for these reasons that the Appellant/Petitioner would 
ask this Court to remand this case back for further proceedings. 
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